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The new Lex Mercatoria and
transnational governance
Alec Stone Sweet
ABSTRACT Over the past four decades, the transnational business community
has successfully built a private system of transnational governance: the new Lex
Mercatoria. The actors who operate this system – firms, their lawyers, international
arbitrators, and legal academics – have evolved, and use, ‘a-national’ principles of
contract and a system of private ‘courts’ to organize and regulate cross-border com-
mercial exchange. National legal systems have adapted to the Lex Mercatoria, thereby
enhancing the latter’s autonomy, and the EU has begun to move in the same
direction.
KEY WORDS arbitration; conflict of laws; contract law; judicialization; law
merchant
Practices that are today essential to the expansion of transnational commerce are
driving the piecemeal construction of a new legal system – what I will simply
call the new Lex Mercatoria. This legal system – replete with its own ‘a-national’
law of contract and a system of private ‘courts’ – is parasitic on state authority. It
uses state authority where necessary, essentially for enforcement purposes, while
otherwise working to reduce the reach of sovereign control over transnational
business. To the extent that national law and courts impose rather than
reduce transaction costs of traders, they are identified as obstacles that the Lex
Mercatoria seeks relentlessly to overcome. National legal systems, for their
part, have steadily adapted to the Lex Mercatoria, thereby altering, among
other things, the relationship between public and private power in Europe.
Finally, European institutions have taken notice, for the obvious reason that
market integration and trade in the EU cannot be dissociated.
This view, while not unique (see Berger 1999; Carbonneau 1997), is deeply
controversial. A ‘war of religion,’ as it has been politely characterized (Berger
1999; Teubner 1997), is being waged in the legal academy about the underlying
nature and scope of the Lex Mercatoria. While I will discuss this controversy
further, my broader purpose is to convince social scientists that the evolution
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of the new Lex Mercatoria deserves their attention, not least because it is central
to governance in a globalized and Europeanized context. Assuming that many
social scientists will not be familiar with my topic (but see the pioneering
papers published by Mattli (2001) and Shapiro (Shapiro and Stone Sweet
2002)), some preliminary remarks may be in order.
First, my empirical focus is on the development of a private system of
governance for transnational business, with special attention paid to Europe.
One must distinguish the ‘transnational space’ described here from the ‘supra-
national space’ constituted by arenas of governance within the European Union
(EU). The latter is public space, created originally by the member states. The
sovereignty claims that have been made for supranational governance – the
supremacy of European law within national legal orders, for example – are
delimited by state boundaries. The former is private, and it makes no sover-
eignty claims, at least not formally. The growth of transnational exchange,
especially intra-EU trade, has been crucial to sustaining the processes through
which supranational governance in the EU has emerged, widened, and deepened
(Fligstein and Stone Sweet 2002; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; see also
Mattli 1999). In this preliminary account of the Lex Mercatoria,1 I will also
focus on rising cross-border commerce, as a functional – a necessary but not
sufficient – condition for the evolution of a new system of managing transna-
tional economic exchange. Further, if distinguishable as autonomous
domains, the transnational and the supranational are nonetheless linked to
one another causally, a point discussed further below.
Second, I define the term, ‘governance,’ in a broad, generic way, as the mech-
anisms through which the rules that govern social exchange in any community
are adapted, on an ongoing basis, to the needs of those who live under them
(Stone Sweet 1999). In its heyday, the so-called Westphalian state constituted
the center of gravity for regulating trade, including trade across borders. Gov-
ernance was largely hierarchical, authoritative government, or the administration
of agreements between governments. In the past three decades, a growing com-
munity has been successful at creating a private system of governance that has, in
turn, generated a host of policy problems that nation states have little choice but
to confront.
Third, because this article attempts to provide a relatively general,
synoptic overview of a complex subject to non-specialists, I have simplified
(sometimes grossly) certain highly technical matters. Moreover, this research
builds on my own theory of how new legal systems evolve, a theory which
mixes ‘rationalist’ and ‘constructivist’ elements, staging them in analytically
precise ways (Stone Sweet 1999). Although this article is partly motivated by
the theory, I will not rehearse the latter here. Instead, I begin with a brief
survey how long-range commercial exchange was governed prior to the con-
temporary period. I then trace the main features of the new Lex Mercatoria,
focusing on the development of an ‘a-national’ legal system. In the con-
clusion, I discuss how this new system is currently being ‘institutionalized’
and with what effects.
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I. ANTECEDENTS
As is well understood in the social sciences, long-range commercial exchange is
only viable if certain basic problems of co-operation, commitment, and insti-
tutional design are overcome (Greif 1989; North 1990; Stone Sweet 1999).
For our purposes, what is important is how actors who would trade across
borders are able to contract with one another and to enforce their contracts
when trading disputes arise. The functionality and social legitimacy of the Lex
Mercatoria derives almost entirely from the fact that it is designed to solve these
problems.
The Lex Mercatoria – also called ‘the Law Merchant’ – is a multi-faceted
term which serves both to draw boundaries around a community and its prac-
tices, and to denote a legal system. It describes the totality of actors, usages,
organizational techniques, and guiding principles that animate private, transna-
tional trading relations, and it refers to the body of substantive law and dispute
resolution procedures that govern these relations. I will use the term in the nar-
rower second sense. The renaissance of ‘the Law Merchant,’ taking place during
the final decades of the twentieth century, is the focus of the rest of the article.
For comparative purposes, I nonetheless begin by summarizing how contract
and enforcement problems were managed, first, prior to the emergence of the
Westphalian state and, second, by the Westphalian state.
The medieval law merchant
The medieval law merchant (MLM), which appeared between the eleventh and
twelfth centuries, comprised a relatively comprehensive, relatively efficient, legal
regime for trade beyond ‘local’ borders. This legal system was operated by
traders and their agents. The functional logic of the MLM is straightforward:
it enabled merchants to escape conflicts between various local customs and
rules, and to avoid submitting to the authority of judges attached to pre-existing
jurisdictions (the courts of feudal manors, city states, local gilds, the Church).
By the close of the twelfth century, the MLM governed virtually all long-
distance trade in Europe and, through middlemen and their codes of
conduct, at critical points along the great Mediterranean and Eastern trading
routes (Greif 1989, 1993).
The MLM regime was ‘voluntarily produced, voluntarily adjudicated, and
voluntarily enforced’ (Benson 1992: 15–19). The regime embodied certain
constitutive principles, including: good faith (promises made must be kept); reci-
procity, non-discrimination between ‘foreigners’ and ‘locals’ at the site of
exchange; third-party dispute settlement; and conflict resolution favoring equity
settlements. In practice, the MLM required traders to use contracts, which
were gradually standardized, and to settle their disputes in courts staffed by
other merchants (experts, not generalists). Traders and their merchant judges
placed a premium on quick judgments, and de-emphasized adversarial pro-
cedure. The function of dispute resolution was not so much to declare a
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‘winner,’ or punish a ‘loser,’ but to resuscitate the contractual agreement and to
cajole the parties to get on with their business, using norms of ‘fairness,’ as
between the parties.
The effectiveness of the MLM depended critically on reputation effects, and
the fear of being ostracized from the trading community. As Milgrom and
colleagues (1990) have it, the crucial problem facing medieval long-range
trade was the ‘costliness of generating and communication information’ about
the histories of potential trading partners. The MLM performed as a kind of
information clearing-house about trading relations, making of reputations a
transferable good, or ‘bond,’ within the community of traders. Third-party
dispute resolution reinforced this ‘reputation system’ (Greif et al. 1994).
Because the results of the merchant judge’s decisions were recorded, traders’
past compliance with decisions could be monitored. The institutional setting
supplied by the MLM created the conditions necessary for constructing stable
conditions favoring exchange in the absence of a coercive state apparatus, by
making promises self-enforcing and by placing future contracting in the
shadow of the law. Those who lost reputation lost trading partners and access
to the MLM.
The new Lex Mercatoria also employs general principles of contract,
mediation and arbitration along equity lines, and means of curating reputations.
The Westphalian state
Until well into the fifteenth century, the Law Merchant provided the insti-
tutional underpinning for most long-distance exchange in the trading
world. By the thirteenth century in England, and thereafter on the Continent,
governments of states sought consciously, first, to emulate the main features of
the MLM, and, second, to subordinate the merchant’s regime to state control.
New statutes, designed to ‘move merchants into royal courts, and/or make
merchant’s courts less desirable’ (Benson 1992: 19), absorbed large parts of
the merchant’s law into the state’s commercial law. At the same time, the
European state gradually weaned itself off its more rapacious practices, such
as repudiation of public debt and confiscations of property (Veitch 1986). By
the close of the sixteenth century, the private commercial law of the nation
state and the state’s lawcourts had reduced the significance and scope of the
Law Merchant, while never quite replacing it. From the point of view of
long-range traders, state building had its advantages. The eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, for example, saw huge reductions in transaction costs, due to
improvements in transportation and communication, in physical security and
policing, and to the emergence of modern banking and insurance practices.
By the end of the nineteenth century, national legal regimes largely governed
transnational commercial activity.
Thousands of volumes have been written about how national judges resolve
conflicts involving cross-border business deals. In a world of sovereign states,
each of which supplies its own authoritative law of contract and courts, it is
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not always obvious and may be a point of contention as to which body of legal
rules is meant to govern a transaction, or a dispute that arises from it. For one or
more reasons, which can fall within dozens of categories, a legal dispute may
arise that involves the law of two or more state jurisdictions. If the dispute
comes before a national judge sitting on a lawcourt of, say, state X, that judge
may choose to assign the law of nation state X to the case, and then proceed
to resolve the dispute in the usual way. Frequently, however, the national law
of the presiding judge is very obviously not the appropriate law. The parties
may have solemnly agreed, for example, that the contract law of nation state
Y would govern their relationship; the material dispute may involve business
that was concluded according to very specific commercial rules provided by
the law of two or more other states (rather than X’s); the business may have
been, or was meant to have been, conducted outside of the territory of state
X (and Y); the deal may involve multiple contracts between a chain of
parties, each doing a different thing, in a different location, under different
national laws. In such cases, our judge must determine which legal system
ought to provide the substantive rules to bear on specific aspects of the
dispute, and then proceed to settle the case.
These practices go by two names, ‘Private International Law,’ and ‘Conflict
of Laws,’ which, for our purposes, are synonyms. I use the word practices,
because conflict of laws has virtually no substantive content (although it is
often portrayed as a branch of law). The private international law is, rather, a
set of techniques or doctrines that are employed by the municipal law judge to
enable the resolution of certain kinds of disputes. These techniques first deve-
loped in Italian city states (twelfth to fourteenth centuries), France (fourteenth
to sixteenth centuries), and the Netherlands (seventeenth century), and, with the
expansion of markets and trade, became widespread across Europe and North
America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Lipstein 1981).
Traders and their lawyers today work consciously to avoid conflict of laws
problems in national courts, because such problems generate unacceptable
costs. Costs include (1) the expense and time it takes to adjudicate claims in
national courts, which are raised if the presiding court has to educate itself
about foreign law, and (2) the uncertainty associated with conflict of laws adju-
dication. To avoid these costs, traders may incorporate specific national rules
and procedures directly into their contract, in choice-of-law and choice-of-
forum clauses (Farnsworth 1985). The second technique is to avoid national
law altogether, by explicitly referencing transnational contract rules (not
national contract law) in choice-of-law clauses, and arbitration houses (not
courts) in choice-of-forum provisions (see below).
In the early modern period, when regional – let alone national – markets
were not well integrated, state building, market formation, the building of
highways, canals, and ports, the elaboration of codes of commercial conduct,
and the construction of legal systems were linked processes. For long-range
merchants, there were obvious advantages to adapting their activities to those
of the state, including enhanced security and enforceability of agreements.
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Nonetheless, the expansion of transnational activity, especially in the 1850
to 1950 period, put intense pressure on states to recognize and adapt to
the special needs of long-distance trade. The development of conflict of laws
techniques represents one important way in which state organizations did
indeed adapt.
In my view, state-supplied institutions governing trade probably reached
their functional limits no later than the 1960s, prompting transnational com-
mercial society and lawyers to begin the work of constructing a new social
order. Today, institutions provided by the state system have lost their domi-
nance, and are being displaced.
The priorities of transnational commercial activity remain autonomy,
security, certainty, and efficiency, but firms and their lawyers have come to
believe that they could, on their own, do better than states. The indicators of
dysfunction in national regimes are clear enough. On the one hand, as
Newman (1998: 1) puts it, ‘litigation means entanglement with a judicial
process that is time-consuming, possibly biased in favor of locals, and perhaps
even corrupt.’ Yet, even assuming that judges will always do their best to be
as efficient and fair as possible, the various national commercial codes and
laws of contract are deeply entrenched, slow to change to inputs from more
cosmopolitan environments, and have a lock on too many judges’ imagin-
ations. Further, conflict of laws techniques are in deep crisis. In the absence
of such techniques, judges simply nationalize transnational disputes, which
would be unacceptable to traders; yet the use of such techniques may produce
even worse outcomes from the point of view of transnational society. In
private international law adjudication, judges must decide which foreign law
is to be assigned to the case, according to a complex set of criteria including
policy considerations, which normally leads the litigants to solicit advice
(another significant transaction cost) on the relative advantages of various
regimes.
Once judges have decided to apply the law of a jurisdiction not their
own, they have to behave as if they were a judge trained in another national
legal system. In the past two decades, a substantial literature has appeared
showing that existing conflict-of-laws techniques lead to wholly unpredictable
decisions, even within the same jurisdiction. In Berger’s (1999: 9–31) survey
of the contemporary literature, conflict of laws is characterized variously,
but always contemptuously: ‘an inveterate evil,’ ‘a murky maze,’ ‘creative
chaos,’ ‘alchemy,’ and a ‘dismal swamp filled with quaking quagmires and
inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious
matters in a strange and incomprehensible jargon.’ Juenger (1998: 277), com-
menting on the American situation, states bluntly that, for proponents of the
Lex Mercatoria, ‘it is a happy coincidence that at this time in the United
States legal history the conflict of laws lies in shambles.’ Finally, litigation
means waiting in line for a judge and then suffering the delays imposed by
procedure, whereas the trading environment can change in a matter of weeks
or even hours.
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Not surprisingly, transnational economic actors increasingly take for granted
the notion that national regimes make it more, not less, difficult for them to
achieve efficiency and predictability in their relations with one another.
2. THE NEW LEX MERCATORIA
In the past three decades, transnational commercial actors have generated their
own institutions. Institution building has proceeded on two linked fronts. The
first is the intensive effort to ‘unify’ or standardize the general principles of a
stable ‘a-national’ contract law; and various standardized, model contracts are
in fact increasingly used. Second, a robust system of private, competing
transnational arbitration houses has evolved, providing traders with a range of
alternatives to litigating transnational contract disputes in state courts. In
consequence, national courts and legislators have adapted, most notably, by
reducing the scope of their authority to regulate both contracting and arbitration.
It is through these processes that the new Lex Mercatoria has achieved meaningful
(but not absolute) autonomy from traditional, public sources of law, such as
national statute and public international law, though how to understand this
autonomy is actively debated. I will take each of these processes in turn.
Towards transnational contract law
Today, trade lawyers have the option of selecting something akin to ‘a-national’
contract law, rather than national law, to govern their relationships. They may
do so, in part, to insulate their contract, and disputes that might arise, from the
control of national judges. The centrality of the Lex Mercatoria as a mode of
governance is partly enabled by the ‘creeping codification’ (Berger 1999; Ferrari
1998) of this law. The more traders and dispute resolvers actually use this law, of
course, the more its autonomy – from national sources of law – is enhanced.
Projects to unify and codify transnational contract law have proliferated in
recent years. The most important of these are run by independent institutes
of practitioners and academics, which have produced draft commercial codes
of global and regional reach. Beginning in the 1970s, for example, the Inter-
national Institute for the Unification of Private Law began work on what
would become the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Con-
tracts, which purports to be a comprehensive code for international commerce
(Berger 1999: chs 3–4; Bonell 1998). The Code (adopted by the Governing
Council in 1994), organized into seven chapters and 119 articles, deals with
the fundamental notions of contract, including pacta sunt servanda, good
faith and fair dealing, validity, interpretation, performance and non-
performance, choice-of-law and forum, and so on. Significantly, the Institute
decided not to submit the code to governments or to intergovernmental
bodies, for fear that rounds of treaty negotiations would lead to changes and
the reassertion of states’, rather than traders’, priorities. In Europe, various pro-
jects to unify European private law have been put forward (discussed by Berger
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1999; Bussani and Mattei 1997/98; Ferrari 1998; Lando 1998), the most
important of which by the Lando Commission on European Contract Law.
The Lando Commission gave its final report, in the form of a code, to EU
organs in 1999, and posted online in 2002.2
Three points about these codes deserve emphasis. First, the drafters of the
UNIDROIT and European Code focused primarily on the identification and
codification of general principles of contract law, principles which they could
claim were common to developed, or ‘mature,’ national systems of law. On
the one hand, they understood that developing bright-line rules would be point-
less, since that is what the lawyers for the contracting parties are meant to do. On
the other hand, contract disputes that do arise are typically about how to under-
stand negotiated rules in light of (changing) circumstances, and it is here that
general principles are used as a guide to interpretation by judges and arbitrators.
The drafters of the codes believed that arbitrators needed a set of general
principles tailored to transnational commerce – to help them escape engaging
in difficult conflict-of-laws choices – and that national judges would be more
likely to enforce arbitral awards that used familiar principles.
Opponents of the Lex Mercatoria have questioned whether general principles
constitute law, at least as they understand law in their own national context.
General principles, by their very nature, are abstract, if not vague; but abstract-
ness has its advantages. National contract law, when read as black-letter law,
suffers from the same alleged problems, precisely because so much of it is
based on principles. But codified private law has already been substantially
‘completed’ by judicial lawmaking, which is partly what makes it ill-adapted
to the needs of modern business. Further, general principles of contract are func-
tional for traders in that they give wide latitude to private arbitrators to tailor
arbitration to the specific needs and wishes of the parties. After all, through con-
tracts, parties create their own law; the Lex Mercatoria is meant to provide an
independent foundation for this law, not to replace it.
Second, the Lex Mercatoria is increasingly being selected as the controlling
law in contracts by traders and arbitrators. The reason is straightforward: a-
national contract law can lower the bargaining and transaction costs of doing
transnational business, including bargaining stalemates wherein neither party
will agree to assign the contract to the specific national jurisdiction preferred
by the other party. They can also easily access contractual instruments in the
virtual space of the Lex Mercatoria. The International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC), for example, has long sold inexpensive model contracts in the form of
a booklet and floppy disk; the contracts are easily customized for specific
needs. The introductory remarks to the ICC’s model international sale contract
(International Chamber of Commerce 1997: 6) states bluntly: ‘parties are
encouraged not to choose a domestic law of sale to govern the contract [emphasis
added].’
Third, what is currently going on in Europe partly reflects an earlier
American experience, while being a microcosm of more global processes. The
inspiration for the UNIDROIT project was the unification of U.S. contract
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law that was provoked through the labors of the American Law Institute (ALI) –
an independent, non-governmental group of scholars and practitioners. In
1932, the ALI first produced a Restatement of the Law of Contracts, which
has been updated thereafter. The Restatement, which appears in the form of
black-letter law, both codifies existing law (including settled case law), and crea-
tively pushes solutions to unsettled questions, against a background of conflict-
of-laws pathology (it is used and cited by state courts). The ALI also oversaw the
drafting of a Uniform Commercial Code (concerning sales and leases of goods,
credit, funds transfers, secured transactions, and so on), which it invited the
states to enact as law. Today, every state but Louisiana has enacted the
statute. In this way, the bulk of the law governing contracts and interstate
trade was harmonized, without federalization. Like the ALI, UNIDROIT and
the Lando Group used comparative methodology and functional analysis
(matching general trade problems with solutions) to arrive at codification.
The International Chamber of Commerce in Paris (ICC) – which is the
center of gravity of the new Lex Mercatoria – has taken the following position
on the matter:
ICC believes that, in order to truly harmonize contract law in Europe, it is
necessary to elaborate an instrument that is similar in form to the U.S.
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) . . . . The scope of the harmonized con-
tract law in Europe could be enlarged as compared to the UCC and also
have enhanced structure and substance. It should be stressed that elaborating
an instrument for harmonized law in Europe may entail work for many years.
ICC is of the opinion that it is more effective for an instrument to evolve
slowly and result in a high-quality product than to implement an instrument
that is of poor quality and introduced hastily. To this end, ICC would like to
recommend that the instrument be adhered to voluntarily by the Member
States and that each Member State could choose to enact the instrument in
whole or only in part.
(ICC 2001)
Transnational dispute resolution
Traders desire third-party dispute resolution that will enforce the law they have
selected to govern their contract, not a law whose origin is outside the contract.
They are further attracted to arbitration, relative to adjudication in national
courts, to the extent that they wish to reduce financial outlays and time
delays, and to the extent that they care about confidentiality (they prefer not
to air the details of their disputes publicly). For these reasons, ‘the tendency
to keep transnational commercial disputes out of the courts, and thereby
beyond the reach of local laws, is nearly universal’ (Juenger 1998: 266).
Today, far more than 90 percent of all transnational commercial contracts
contain an arbitration clause (Berger 1999: 111). The explosive increase in inter-
national trade since the late 1950s has been the catalyst. Higher levels of
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transnational activity have meant more arbitration, and more arbitration has
meant a gradual formalization of procedures. As the institutionalization of
global arbitration of private commercial disputes has proceeded, the autonomy
of the Lex Mercatoria has, again, been enhanced.
The international arbitration story has a similar plot, some of the same char-
acters, and much the same ending as the story just told about contracts. In the
1950s, UNIDROIT produced a Draft Uniform Law of Arbitration. This
project was followed by the UN Commission on International Trade Law’s
(UNCITRAL’s) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of
1985. While there are differences, both are model codes meant to unify national
rules concerning arbitration, through adoption as national legislation. Both
emphasize what transnational business most desires from the Lex Mercatoria –
the freedom of private parties: to contract; to choose arbitration and their
arbitrators; to arbitral discretion in tailoring the law to the case; to procedural
fairness on terms acceptable to the traders themselves; and to restricted national
judicial review of arbitral awards. Some states have in fact adopted parts of these
(and other) model laws in their own internal reforms of codes governing
commercial transaction, reforms all but required by the explosion of global
trade (see discussion below). As important, the trading community has increas-
ingly treated these rules as part of the customary law governing their relations
(Lex Mercatoria).
The number of arbitral centers that handle transnational business disputes
has grown at an astounding pace. In 1910, there were ten arbitration houses;
there were over 100 by 1985; and today there are more than 150. In Europe,
the biggest houses are the ICC, based in Paris, the London Court of Inter-
national Arbitration (LCIA), and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
(SCC). At the ICC, the oldest, biggest, and most important such institution,
traders filed some 3,000 disputes for arbitration during the 1920 to 1980
period, more than 3,500 during the 1990s, and 5,250 during the 1996 to
2005 period.3 By 2004, the annual number of filings exceeded 550, and the
annual number of awards rendered exceeded 350. The ICC is also the most
global house: in 2005, 521 requests for arbitration concerned 1,422 parties
based in 117 different countries (about 10 percent of the parties are states or
public authorities; the rest are private parties). In 1996, the share of West Euro-
pean parties to arbitration fell to below 50 percent of the total for the first time,
while the share of Latin American, Asian, and East European parties has risen.
Approximately 70 percent of all cases concern ‘inter-regional’ contracts, wherein
at least two of the parties involved in the dispute are based on different conti-
nents. The SCC specializes in contract disputes among Scandinavian firms
and, increasingly, between firms of Western Europe and those of the Baltics
and the former Soviet Union. In the 1970s, the SCC processed eleven arbitra-
tions per year on average, twenty-nine per year in the 1980s, 110 in the 1990s –
but 169 in 2003 alone. The LCIA, dominated by parties whose origin is the UK
(about 30 percent), the USA, and the old EC-12, today receives just over 100
requests for arbitration per year.
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From the point of view of traders, arbitrating in an established house makes
good sense. In addition to the advantages already discussed, even a complex arbi-
tration can normally be completed within six months, and the price of the
service can be selected according to the size of the financial stakes at issue, or
the desired complexity of the arbitral procedures.4 Further, the major houses
are constantly engaged in developing new services to increase efficiency and
attract firms whose disputes would normally not be worth a full arbitration,
given the ratio of costs to the sums involved. Thus, both the ICC and the
SCC have developed various forms of mediation and fast-track ‘mini-trials.’
They will also help the parties select mediators and arbitrators, and they keep
a list of technical experts in diverse areas of commerce, for the use of the
parties and arbitrators (which is viewed as a better solution than the parties
paying their own experts to testify on their behalf). The relaunched Venice
House – the Venice Chamber of International Arbitration – which is
making a bid to capture the business of European firms engaged in trading
with the Middle and Far East, offers one-day arbitrations to their customers.
Adaptations
The rise of the new Lex Mercatoria raises deep questions about the nature of law,
and about the relationship of law to state power. Since the mid-1960s, scholars
and practitioners have generated a voluminous literature on these questions,
with no resolution of the main problems in sight. Much of it will seem
ferociously complex to outsiders, precisely because it is written by and for
insiders. The insiders are lawyer-practitioners, arbitrators, executive officials of
arbitration houses, and the academics who specialize in the law of international
commercial. Traditionalists tend to portray the Lex Mercatoria as a set of
practices enabled by states. In their view, over time states have granted,
within realms constructed through treaty law and national statute, more
rather than less contractual autonomy to transnational economic actors, while
retaining ultimate regulatory authority over these practices. Underlying this
view rests a theory of law according to which only public authority – the
commands of a sovereign – can produce law, or confer legal validity upon
private acts. In contrast, proponents of the Lex Mercatoria argue that state
authorities have largely ‘relinquished their authority to regulate’ transnational
contracting and arbitration, permitting both ‘to function autonomously’ in
what is, in effect, an ‘a-national’ way (Carbonneau 1997: 293).
Traditionalists tend to focus less on what traders, their lawyers, and arbitra-
tors are actually doing, and more on the linked problems of validity and enfor-
cement of contracts and arbitral decisions. Their strongest argument for the
continuing relevance of national law and courts to transnational commercial
activity is a straightforward one: traders need the coercive state for enforcement
purposes. Through various international instruments, the most important of
which is the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, states have agreed to limits on the reach of their own
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jurisdiction. The New York Convention is a short treaty, with narrow but
important purposes. It provides that states ‘shall recognize’ the validity of
arbitral agreements, and that states shall, through their courts, enforce arbitral
judgments subject, inter alia, to the exceptions of ‘inarbitrability’ and ‘public
policy.’5 At present, 137 states have ratified the Convention.
Clearly the development of the Lex Mercatoria has been spurred by ratifica-
tion of the New York Convention. Its broad function has been, in Carbonneau’s
words (1997: 392), to ‘eradicate systemic hostility to arbitration . . . stemming
from the view that arbitration amounts to a usurpation of judicial adjudicatory
authority.’ At the same time, the nation state has adapted far more to the Lex
Mercatoria than vice versa, going far beyond the black-letter dictates of the
Convention. One sees a broad pattern of ‘sovereign acquiescence’ to the
construction of the new Law Merchant (Carbonneau 1992: 119).
While I will turn to the specific situation in the U.S. and Europe below, three
general trends merit discussion in advance. First, in the law of most advanced
industrial states, the recognition and validity of a contract, before a national
judge, are now presumed, even if the contract law in question has no relation-
ship to the law of that judge’s jurisdiction. Second, national statutes and judicial
case law concerning arbitration have been dramatically transformed, in ways
that enhance the autonomy of the Law Merchant. To take three examples, arbi-
tral clauses are today commonly treated as separable from the main contract
(they constitute agreements within agreements),6 the scope of judicial review
of arbitral awards has been radically reduced,7 and issues of Kompetenz–
Kompetenz have been largely resolved in arbitrators’ favor (arbitrators determine
the scope of their own jurisdiction).8 Third, the public policy and inarbitrability
exceptions to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, contained in
the New York Convention and thus in most national statutes, are being con-
structed narrowly by national courts and, in some countries like the United
States and France, have little practical relevance.
In the United States, the law on international commercial arbitration is
entirely a matter of how the Federal courts have interpreted the New York Con-
vention, which the U.S. ratified in 1970. In this case law, American judges have
appeared anxious to support arbitrators vis-à-vis disgruntled parties, and to
reduce the scope of substantive review afforded the latter in American courts.
In Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler (U.S. Supreme Court 1985), the Supreme
Court all but abolished the role of American courts in reviewing the substance
of what arbitrators do. The post-Mitsubishi era shows the Federal courts favor-
ing the wider interests of transnational society rather than the specific interests of
American business, even when public policy considerations raised by the dispute
could be interpreted as overlapping with national security interests. The Sun Oil
v. Libya case is a good example.
In 1990, a Federal district court forced an American company, Sun Oil, to
pay a $20 million ICC award to a Libyan company (U.S. Supreme Court
1990), after Sun terminated its participation in an oil exploration program in
Libya. Sun was required to do so, pursuant to the U.S. government’s decisions
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prohibiting any travel to that country on U.S. passports, and banning imports
from Libya, including oil, and exports of goods and technical information.
Further, the government denied Sun Oil’s application for a license to export
data and technology to Libya. Libya won the case in the ICC, prompting Sun
to refuse compliance. Libya sued in American courts to enforce the award,
and the district court sided with the Libyans. Sun claimed that to affirm the
award would effectively ‘penalize Sun for obeying . . . its government,’ and
weaken ‘the ability of the U.S. government to make and enforce policies with
economic costs to U.S. citizens and corporations.’ The court rejected the plea,
declaring that ‘“public policy” and “foreign policy” were “not synonymous.”’
The court admitted that ‘Libya itself is not a signatory to the New York Con-
vention . . . and [that] if the tables were turned . . . a U.S. company would not
necessarily be able to enforce an arbitral award against a [Libyan company] in
Libyan courts.’ But, the court continued, ‘Libya’s terrorist tactics and opportu-
nistic attitude towards international commerce are simply beside the point.’
Since 1970, it appears that U.S. courts have only twice refused to enforce
foreign arbitral awards, and then only in part (Stewart 1992: 191–2).
In Europe, national adaptation to the Lex Mercatoria is most visible in legis-
lative revisions to the relevant code law (commentaries and assessments of these
revisions are regularly published in the international arbitration journals). By
the end of the 1990s, nearly all states in Western Europe, Central Europe,
and those formed after the breakup of the Soviet Union had adopted new
legislation aligning their law with the UNCITRAL’s model law of 1985 on
international arbitration (the exceptions are the Netherlands and Switzerland,
which have maintained their own models, and France and Belgium, which
reformed their legal regimes before UNCITRAL finished its work). Reforms
have been in one direction: to enhance the autonomy and a-national character
of the Law Merchant. While there remain important technical differences, the
new statutes treat international arbitration more liberally than they do domestic
arbitration; confer upon the contracting parties a wider scope to choose pro-
cedures and the controlling law of contract and arbitration; codify a doctrine
of separability (n. 5); recognize at least implicitly the Kompetenz–Kompetenz
of arbitrators as well as their capacity to resolve conflict of laws issues (n. 7);
and reduce the grounds for judicial review of awards to a bare minimum. In
France, the new code aligned itself with ICC priorities (Carbonneau 1992:
121), even placing the Lex Mercatoria on an ‘equal footing’ with national and
international sources of law as legitimate bases for awards (see Delaume
1995: 9–10). ‘The common thrust of the recent European statutory law,’
Drobnig (1998: 195) writes, ‘elevates arbitration to the status of a true
alternative to the traditional court system for dispute resolution.’
There are at least three underlying motivations for deregulation. First, legis-
lators and judges find it in the national interest to encourage transnational com-
merce. Second, court systems are overloaded. Providing for the autonomy of
private international law arbitration drains off much complex litigation for
which national law is less and less relevant, and for which (generalist) judges
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are less and less prepared. Third, there is now international ‘competition for the
“business” of . . . international arbitration,’ and liberalizing is essential to attract-
ing this business (Drobnig 1998: 196). In updating their own codes, German
and Italian legislators claimed to be working to make their systems as hospitable
to arbitration as France, and the United States. Such efforts feed back on arbi-
tration in obvious ways. Here is how the new Venice House, on its website
(www.venca.it), describes its own renaissance:
The adoption by the Italian Parliament, on January 5, 1994, of legislation on
international arbitration was the decisive element in our taking a fresh
approach to arbitration. The Chamber and its Rules are a creative response
to the lessons read from the long experience of the International Chamber
of Commerce in Paris and its rules and case-law, and the principles and
rules [of contract and arbitration] recently developed by UNCITRAL.
The Chamber means to offer to commercial operators an agile and . . .
speedy . . . procedure. For this purpose, the Chamber has adopted Rules of
Arbitration suitable to avoid and to limit delays and, above all, to contain
proceedings’ expenses, by keeping registration, administrative and arbitrators’
fees low.
The Lex Mercatoria and European integration
For many readers of this journal, the discussion so far may be useful only insofar
as it leads to this question: What has all of this got to do with European inte-
gration, or public policy? I have several (linked) responses.
First, it is the growth of cross-border trade, undertaken by private firms, that
has driven the transformative processes discussed above. If European integration
has been heavily conditioned by transnational activity (Sandholtz and Stone
Sweet 1998; Stone Sweet 2004), it must be that integration processes and the
rise of the new Lex Mercatoria are causally linked to one another. Stone Sweet
and Brunell (1998) showed that the expansion of intra-EU trade activated the
EU’s legal system, and the operation of the EU’s legal system led to the
further expansion in trade. The finding has been subjected to more rigorous
testing by economists and found to be extraordinarily robust (e.g. Pitarkis
and Tridimas 2003). Put simply, the rise of the Lex Mercatoria and the
operation of the EU’s legal system have both facilitated an expansion in
trade; more trade means more contracting across borders, and therefore
more demand for third-party dispute resolution (assuming that the ratio of
disputes to contracts is constant or falls less than the marginal growth in total
contracting). A complex double feedback loop is constituted.
Second, the European version of the Lex Mercatoria – in the form of the
Lando Code and the rise of a system of arbitration houses that compete with
one another and with national courts for business – was provoked by the
Single Market program. Indeed, Lando and elements within the Brussels Com-
mission do not believe that a Single Market can be declared to be ‘completed’
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without the harmonization of European private law. This view is a matter of
some debate, of course, but it is vigorously supported by, among others, the
ICC (2001).
Third, we have already seen that national legal systems in Europe have been
steadily adapting to the new Lex Mercatoria over the past twenty years, and this
adaptation accelerated as the twentieth century drew to a close. It should be
obvious that the more national law comes to recognize the contractual
freedom of transnational firms, and the arbitral freedom of private courts, the
more pressure there will be on the EU’s bodies to co-ordinate what should
remain in the public interest to regulate. The EU has long regulated aspects
of private law, such as consumer protection, but we should expect it to move
more aggressively into other areas. In 2003, the Commission submitted its
‘Action Plan’ for ‘A More Coherent European Contract Law’ (Commission
of the European Communities 2003), and this initiative is currently organizing
intensive debate on whether the EU needs a European civil code and unified
contract law and, if not, just what it needs. It is worth noting that in a 2005
survey of 175 firms, of different size and kind, across Europe, 80% of respon-
dents stated that they would welcome an EU contract law as a means to help
overcome obstacles to trade, but only if it is optional. ‘The same proportion
of businesses regarded it as important to be able to choose the governing law
of their contracts.’9 This view is, again, supported by the ICC (2001).
3. CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONALIZATION
In a brief account such as this, little is lost in emphasizing functional logics–
such as the relative institutional efficiencies of cross-border commercial
activity – as the catalyst for the rise of the new Lex Mercatoria. The institution-
alization of arbitration as a system of governance, however, is quite a different
matter. By institutionalization, I mean the process through which arbitral prac-
tices are consolidated as stable rules and procedures. The growing popularity of
arbitration houses, as substitutes for national courts, has pushed arbitrators to
maximizing values other than the parties’ private right to contract. Most
important, they are increasingly moved by considerations of legal certainty –
arbitrators use the word justice – not simply for the parties involved in a specific
case, but also for future users of the system. In other words, arbitrators are
becoming – if with some hand-wringing and reluctance – default lawmakers
for traders.
To be sure, the arbitral concern for justice can be expressed in the language of
efficiency, that is, as yet another drive to reduce transaction costs. Producing just
and fair decisions, after all, helps to elicit compliance from the losing party, and
to reduce the animosity of national judicial systems to the exercise of arbitral
power, if enforcement becomes necessary. Reducing enforcement problems
means attracting more customers. In this way, everyone in the system is made
better off. To achieve just results is to enhance legal certainty; and legal uncer-
tainty is one of the reasons why national systems (with their arcane conflict of
A.S. Sweet: New Lex Mercatoria and transnational governance 641
law methods) had come to be avoided in the first place. A great deal could be
said about these issues, but one point is clear. The balance between (1) pro-
cedural efficiency, and (2) predictability of outcomes (i.e., a concern for
justice and legal certainty) is being recalibrated to the advantage of the latter.
The more arbitrators care about justice, the more arbitration will be judicialized
(Lillich and Brower 1992); and the more arbitration mimics litigation, the more
costly the system will be to run (Holtzmann 1992; Okekeifere 1998).
Judicialization is in fact proceeding along three linked dimensions. The first
concerns who arbitrates. Whereas a single arbitrator was once commonplace,
parties today typically demand three panel members, as ‘additional assurance
that [they] will not become victims of a single arbitrator’s folly’ (Newman
1998: 5). This is all the more true for relatively high stakes disputes. Further,
as arbitration has increased in popularity, bigger (in terms of money) and
more complex (in terms of the contractual instruments) cases have been filed.
Arbitration houses have had little choice but to replace the once ubiquitous
trade generalist with the technical expert, and to develop more formal and
complex procedures to deal with the demands being placed on them (Dezelay
and Bryant 1996).
Second, arbitral procedures are developing quickly, and several codes – to be
used by ‘parties coming from different legal traditions’ – governing the taking of
evidence, discovery, and the testimony of third parties and other experts are
available (e.g., IBA 1999). More complex procedures are, in part, a product
of increasing adversarialism, as lawyers use the techniques of litigation to gain
advantages, or level the field, in arbitral settings. Partly, it is again related to a
concern for justice. Arbitrators wishing to produce the fairest possible decision
can hardly allow one or both of the parties to hide relevant facts, or selectively
reveal evidence, or lie outright. As Newman (1998: 4) has it, ‘the recent trend
. . . has been to add more complex procedures, thereby providing the parties
with greater assurance of a just result.’
Third, and I consider this to be the crucial move, the Lex Mercatoria is now
being built through precedent. It is a matter of dogmatic orthodoxy in positivist
jurisprudence (Hart 1994; MacCormack 1978) that judicial discretion can be
counted as a virtue to the extent that judges actually use their discretion to
enhance legal certainty (i.e., to reduce normative indeterminacy). They do so
by developing and applying rules to govern their own decision-making. The
most important of these is the famous principle of formal justice: like cases
will be decided similarly. Arbitrators, today, increasingly behave according to
the dictates of this model, and self-consciously so. Arbitrators work to generate
just decisions, but they are also careful to insist that decisions in equity are pos-
sible only if anchored in general principles. Further, if their clients act in ways
that introduce adversarial legalism to the proceedings, then arbitrators may be
all but required to justify their decisions; that is, to adopt a nascent ‘giving
reasons’ requirement. Arbitrators need to defend their own reputations for fair-
ness, vis-à-vis the parties to the dispute before them;10 they also have a corporate
interest in making the law that governs international commerce clear,
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transparent, and available to future disputants. Giving reasons for their
decisions, and publishing them, allows them to do both.
Today, more and more decisions are being published, and certain kinds of
decisions are treated by subsequent litigators as having precedential value.11
The published rulings of arbitral panels sitting for important, high-profile dis-
putes may be full of dicta, which the panel has designed to make general points
about general principles; they do so in order to help codify the Lex Mercatoria.
Practices associated with precedent, once only implied, are now explicitly
applied (see Berger 1999: 57–74, 214–20). Carbonneau (1997: 16–18)
refers to the steady emergence of an ‘arbitral common law,’ tailored to the
needs of specific types of traders, through case-by-case dispute settlement.
Not surprisingly, the question of whether the creation of appellate instances
for the arbitral system is being actively debated (Seventh Geneva Global Arbi-
tration Forum 1999; Werner 1999). Each of the major arbitral tribunals has
developed institutions charged with reviewing and approving awards, before
they may enter into effect.
The dynamics of the overall process should be obvious. In Europe, in certain
core domains of commercial activity, the sovereign has declared that it shall no
longer govern. A private system has taken over, but the viability of this system
may rest on its capacity to manage its own political development (judicializa-
tion). Decentralized, transnational ‘governance’ will now begin to take on the
features of ‘government.’
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NOTES
1 Based in part on Shapiro and Stone Sweet (2002: ch. 5).
2 The Lando Commission’s Principles of European Contract Law is online at: http://
www.jus.uio.no/lm/private.international.commercial.law/contract.principles.
3 The data reported on these three European arbitral institutions were collected by the
author on site.
4 Readers can amuse themselves by calculating the costs of any dispute online: for the
ICC, at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/cost_calculator/cost_calculator.-
asp; and for the SCC, at http://www.sccinstitute.com/uk/Calculator/. Note
that the majority of disputes concern sums exceeding $1,000,000. Calculating
LCIA rates is not as formulaic: see http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/.
5 Art. V.2 of the Convention states that ‘Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recog-
nition is sought finds that: (a) the subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlements by arbitration under the law of that country; or (b) the recognition or
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.’
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6 National laws increasingly accept what is known as the ‘separability doctrine,’
according to which the validity of the arbitral clause is not affected by the legal
nullity of the contract of which it is a part. In essence, the doctrine forecloses
moves by one of the parties to the contract to avoid arbitration by pleading the
contract’s nullity.
7 That is, the legal validity, in national law, of arbitral awards is presumed.
8 Kompetenz–Kompetenz refers to the formal competence of a jurisdiction to deter-
mine its own jurisdiction, or the jurisdiction of another organ. Modern arbitration
statutes and case law largely accept that the arbitrator possesses the authority to fix
the scope of its own jurisdiction, subject of course to the will of the contracting
parties.
9 Survey reported at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?article_id¼32445.
10 As Newman (1998: 5) puts it, ‘A reasoned award is one of the only protections the
parties have against decisions born of caprice, bias, or intellectual indolence . . . . The
practice of rendering awards without explaining them is not suitable for complex
international matters.’
11 Important decisions are regularly published in various specialized journals, often
with commentaries by eminent arbitrators and scholars. The ICC publishes its
own volumes of redacted awards.
REFERENCES
Benson, B. (1992) ‘Customary law as a social contract: international commercial law’,
Constitutional Political Economy 3: 1–27.
Berger, K. (1999) The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, The Hague: Kluwer.
Bonell, M. (1998) ‘UNIDROIT principles and the Lex Mercatoria’, in
T.E. Carbonneau (ed.), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion of the New
Law Merchant, Yonkers: Juris.
Bussani, M. and Mattei, U. (1997/98) ‘The common core approach to European
private law’, Columbia Journal of European Law 3: 339–56.
Carbonneau, T. (1992) ‘National law and the judicialization of arbitration: manifest
destiny, manifest disregard, or manifest error’, in R.B. Lillich and C.N. Brower
(eds), International Arbitration in the 21st Century: Towards ‘Judicialization’ and
Conformity?, Irvington, NY: Transnational.
Carbonneau, T. (1997) Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion of the New Law
Merchant, Yonkers: Juris.
Commission of the European Communities (2003) ‘A more coherent European con-
tract law: an action plan’, COM 68 Final, December 2.
Delaume, G. (1995) ‘Reflections on the effectiveness of international arbitral awards’,
Journal of International Arbitration 12: 5–19.
Dezelay, Y. and Bryant, G. (1996) Dealing in Virtue: International Commerical Arbitra-
tion and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order, Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
Drobnig, U. (1998) ‘Assessing arbitral autonomy in European statutory law’, in
T. Carbonneau (ed.), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion of the New Law
Merchant, Yonkers: Juris.
Farnsworth, A. (1985) ‘Conflict of laws: problems that face transnational business and
how to avoid them’, in B.A. Allen and C.S. Ward (eds), The United States, Trans-
national Business, and the Law, New York: Oceana.
Ferrari, F. (1998) The Unification of International Commercial Law, Baden-Baden:
Nomos.
Fligstein, N. and Stone Sweet, A. (2002) ‘Of polities and markets: an institutionalist
account of European integration’, American Journal of Sociology 107: 1206.
644 Journal of European Public Policy
Greif, A. (1989) ‘Reputation and coalitions in medieval trade: evidence on the Maghribi
traders’, Journal of Economic History 49: 857–82.
Greif, A. (1993) ‘Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: the
Maghribi trader’s coalition’, American Economic Review 83: 425–48.
Greif, A., Milgrom, P. and Weingast, B. (1994) ‘Coordination, commitment, and
enforcement: the case of the Merchant Guild’, Journal of Political Economy 102:
745–76.
Hart, H.L.A. (1994) The Concept of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Holtzmann, H. (1992) ‘Balancing the need for certainty and flexibility in international
arbitration procedures’, in R.B. Lillich and C.N. Brower (eds) International Arbitra-
tion in the 21st Century: Towards ‘Judicialization’ and Conformity?, Irvington, NY:
Transnational.
International Bar Association (1999) ‘IBA rules on the taking of evidence in inter-
national commercial arbitration’, London: IBA.
International Chamber of Commerce (1997) The ICC Model International Sale
Contract, Paris: ICC Pub. No. 556 (E).
International Chamber of Commerce (2001) ICC comments on the Communication
from the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
European Contract Law. DOC 373/416, Paris: ICC.
Juenger, F.K. (1998) ‘The Lex Mercatoria and the conflict of laws’, in
T.E. Carbonneau (ed.), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion of the New
Law Merchant, Yonkers: Juris.
Lando, O. (1998) ‘Optional or mandatory Europeanisation of contract law’,
Presented at the Workshop, Private Law Adjudication in the European Multi-Level
System, October 2–3, San Domenico di Fiesole: Robert Schuman Centre, European
University Institute.
Lillich, R. and Brower, C.N. (eds) (1992) International Arbitration in the 21st Century:
Towards ‘Judicialization’ and Conformity?, Irvington, NY: Transnational.
Lipstein, K. (1981) Principles of the Conflict of Laws, National and International, The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
MacCormack, N. (1978) Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mattli, W. (1999) The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Mattli, W. (2001) ‘Private justice in a global economy: from litigation to arbitration’,
International Organization 55: 919.
Milgrom, P.R., North, D.C. and Weingast, B.R. (1990) ‘The role of institutions in
the revival of trade: the law merchant, private judges, and the champagne fairs’,
Economics and Politics 2: 1–23.
Newman, L.W. (1998) ‘A practical assessment of arbitral dispute resolution’, in
T. Carbonneau (ed.), Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion of the New Law
Merchant, Yonkers: Juris.
North, D.C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Okekeifere, A.I. (1998) ‘Commercial arbitration as the most effective dispute resolution
method: still a fact or now a myth?’, Journal of International Arbitration 15: 81–105.
Pitarkis, J. and Tridimas, G. (2003) ‘Joint dynamics of legal and economic integration
in the European Union’, European Journal of Law and Economics 16: 357.
Sandholtz, W. and Stone Sweet, A. (eds) (1998) European Integration and Supranational
Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Seventh Geneva Global Arbitration Forum (1999) ‘Reconsidering a key tenet of inter-
national commercial arbitration: is finality of awards what parties really need? Has
the time of an international appellate arbitral body arrived?’, Journal of International
Arbitration 16: 57–114.
A.S. Sweet: New Lex Mercatoria and transnational governance 645
Shapiro, M. (2002) ‘Globalization and freedom of contract,’ in M. Shapiro and
A. Stone Sweet (eds), On Law, Politics, and Judicialization, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Stewart, D.P. (1992) ‘National enforcement of arbitral awards under treaties and
conventions’, in R.B. Lillich and C.N. Brower (eds), International Arbitration in
the 21st Century: Towards ‘Judicialization’ and Conformity? Irvington, NY:
Transnational.
Stone Sweet, A. (1999) ‘Judicialization and the construction of governance’, Compara-
tive Political Studies 31: 147–84
Stone Sweet, A. (2004) The Judicial Construction of Europe, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Stone Sweet, A. and Brunell, T. (1998) ‘Constructing a supranational constitution:
dispute resolution and governance in the European Community’, American
Political Science Review 92: 63–81.
Teubner, G. (1997) ‘Global Bukowina: legal pluralism in world society’, in G. Teubner
(ed.), Global Law Without a State, Brookfield: Dartmouth, pp. 3–28.
U.S. Supreme Court (1985) Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc,
473 U.S. 614.
U.S. Supreme Court (1990) National Oil Corporation v. Libyan Sun Oil Co. 733
F. Supp. 800 (D.Del. 1990).
Veitch, J. (1986) ‘Repudiations and confiscations by the medieval state’, Journal of
Economic History 46: 31–6.
Werner, J. (1999) ‘Reconsidering a key tenet of international commercial arbitration: is
finality of awards what parties really need? Has the time for an international appellate
arbitral body arrived?’, Journal of International Arbitration 16: 57–61.
Final version accepted for publication 15/03/06
646 Journal of European Public Policy
